The U.S. Can Tackle Dominican Transnational Gangs—Legally and Effectively

By Eduardo A. Gamarra

The Dominican Republic has long been viewed as a relatively stable democracy in the Caribbean. However, that image is being challenged by increasingly complex and dangerous criminal dynamics. Recent fieldwork I conducted with colleagues confirms that transnational organized crime is evolving rapidly, linking Dominican street gangs to global criminal networks in ways that have serious implications not only for the region but also for communities across the United States.

Gangs such as Los Trinitarios and Dominicans Don’t Play (DDP), originally formed in U.S. prisons, now operate across multiple countries, including Spain, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. While some of their activities based in the U.S. have drawn attention, their growing integration into global trafficking networks—collaborating with Mexican cartels, ColombianDTOs, Italian, Balkan, and Turkish syndicates—is less well understood.

These alliances have made the Caribbean, particularly Hispaniola, a convergence point for global crime. Haitian gangs like 400 Mawozo are increasingly using Dominican territory as a base for logistics and refuge. With a porous border and limited institutional oversight, the island has become a hub for drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering.

The Dominican government has taken some steps to address this crisis. In February, President Luis Abinader designated Haitian gangs as terrorist organizations under Dominican law, citing their extreme violence and control of territory in Haiti. While such a move reflects the urgency of the threat in the local context, the Dominican state continues to struggle with institutional weakness and high levels of corruption that limit its capacity to act decisively.

Dominican gangs have evolved into transnational criminal organizations. They undermine democratic institutions, exploit remittance flows and informal financial systems, and pose a significant challenge to public security in the Caribbean, Spain, Chile, and even in some U.S. communities.

Proposals to designate these groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) have been made. If applied with caution, this tool could enable stronger cross-border cooperation, enhance financial surveillance, and impose criminal penalties on those providing material support to criminal networks. However, considering this approach must be carefully calibrated and include safeguards for due process and individual rights.

There are other legal and policy options available to the United States to confront these threats:

The Dominican Republic still has an opportunity to act before violence and corruption become irreversible. U.S. policymakers should collaborate with Dominican partners to support these efforts while maintaining a clear perspective on the risks posed by increasingly sophisticated criminal networks.

What happens in the Dominican Republic doesn’t stay on the island. It reaches U.S. streets, financial institutions, and border enforcement systems. Understanding how these groups operate and deploying the right tools—smartly, proportionally, and legally—is essential for protecting both regional security and democratic governance.

Eduardo A. Gamarra is a professor of political science at Florida International University and director of the Latino Public Opinion Forum.