FIU Panel Explores Venezuela's Political and Economic Landscape

The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, in partnership with the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, hosted a panel that explored Venezuela’s evolving political and economic landscape, the role it plays in regional dynamics, and its broader implications on global geopolitics.

Titled “Venezuela at a Crossroads: Will Maduro Step Down? Will Gonzalez Urrutia be sworn in? Scenarios for 2025,” the panel of specialists discussed what lies ahead as both the United States and Venezuela prepare to navigate key political milestones.

Brian Fonseca, director of Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, moderated the third panel in the series that began in October.

This panel included Mark Feierstein, who is currently a senior advisor with the Latin American Program at the U.S. Institute for Peace; Geoff Ramsey, who is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and Gustavo Azócar, a journalist, writer, and political consultant in Venezuela.

January will be a pivotal month for both the United States and Venezuela as both countries will swear in their incoming leadership. On January 20^th, President-elect Donald Trump (R) will become the 47^thpresident of the U.S., and on January 10^th, Venezuela will either see the Maduro regime continue its reign, or it will welcome Eduardo Gonzalez Urrutia as its new president. Odds are that the latter won’t happen, but Gonzalez Urrutia mentioned last week that he does intend to travel back to Venezuela on January 10^th to assume his role as the “elected president” of Venezuela.

Hypothetically, if Gonzalez Urrutia was sworn in as the new president, the relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela would dramatically change, but as it stands, foreign policy experts are expecting the Maduro regime to maintain control. So how would the U.S. respond?

According to Azócar, he posited that if Maduro is sworn in as president, he will “militarize” the city of Caracas to make sure that the opposition is not mobilized on that day. In response to Gonzalez Urrutia affirming that he will travel to Venezuela, Azócar questioned if Gonzalez Urrutia will really travel, and if so, how will he travel?

If he does arrive in Venezuela, how exactly will he be sworn in as president? The Venezuelan constitution dictates that the president must be sworn in in the National Assembly, which is currently under Maduro’s control.

Feierstein weighed in on the relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela leading up to January 10^th, commenting that while the Biden Administration has recognized Gonzalez Urrutia as the president of Venezuela, they haven’t designated him as the president of the country. This is likely not to change in the last days of the Biden Administration.

The Trump Administration is expected to add pressure to the Maduro regime, and more aggressive sanctions are probable. The panelists agreed that the Trump Administration’s approach during its first term was not effective, so would a second Trump presidency adopt a different approach?

“It has been proven that sanctions levied by the U.S. between 2019 and 2023 against the Venezuelan oil sector not only impacted Venezuela’s weak economy …. they also sent Maduro to embrace China, Russia and Iran,” said Azocar.  He added that every time that the oil industry is sanctioned, “Maduro clings to the Russians, the Chinese because they’re his allies to confront the U.S.”

In the end, Azocar affirmed that economic sanctions “impact the economy,” causing “unemployment and migration.”

Azócar suggested that the political engagement of opposition leaders Maria Corina Machado and Gonzalez Urrutia, has made Venezuelans more hopeful about their country’s future despite the country facing political and economic crises, and this hope could influence the way the U.S. responds to Venezuela.

“There is support for targeted sanctions, individual sanctions, which the Biden Administration has used extensively” Feierstein noted. “There is much less support for economic sanctions, and there is the sense that it hurts people more generally, and that’s been true for some time,” he added.

Feierstein noted that economic sanctions against Venezuela left the country “poorer, the opposition weaker, Maduro further ensconced in power and contributed to increase migration.  I’m not saying [sanctions] are the cause of those things, but maximum pressure contributed to the worsening of it.”

To the question about the expectations of the international community in terms of its ability to shape situation in Venezuela, Azocar responded, “to solve the political crisis, we require support from the international community… Maduro would not be there without Chinese, Russian and Iranian support, not only military.” Azocar highlighted Iran’s participation in various industries, including gold and oil – particularly in refineries—as well as retail and others.

Ramsey noted that “China, Iran and Russia have been crucial in the regime’s survival,” although, “I think it gets a little overplayed.” He believes that what policymakers have to ask themselves is, “is it in our interest to rescind all the [oil] licenses and watch how Venezuela drifts away into the arms of these countries?”

In terms of what else could have been done to drive a democratic transition in Venezuela, Ramsey said that many in Washington believed “that it would be costlier to the regime to steal the election… we assumed there was more fracture inside the regime that there really was.” Fierenstein agreed, stating “I assumed a 2-1 victory would put more power under the opposition.”

As to what to expect from a Trump 2.0 administration, Fierenstein stated, “I think what we did see during the Trump years when the administration would talk about all options being on the table, implying the possibility of some sort of invasion of sorts… that did raise expectations for opposition leaders at the time, for average Venezuelans, and I think some of that is returning as well..”

Fonseca said, “given the importance of immigration in [Trump’s] foreign policy, he’s going to find ways to engage with the regime.”  When asked if engaging with Maduro would impact President Trump’s support from Venezuelans in South Florida, Fonseca speculated, “it could cost him some support but it may not be enough to lose Florida… he’s been incredibly resilient.”